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ination of clergy's theological views, political orientations and activities, church and community characteristics, and views on the work of their denominations. The survey instrument specifically measured attitudes about their denomination's activities and agencies, including the ELCA's Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs (LOGA) and the Episcopal Church's Office of Government Relations (OGR). We also asked the clergy to indicate what types of denominational activities they find appropriate, including lobbying government.
Why do we focus our analysis on clergy? Clergy are among the most important contacts on the ground for the national-level lobbying offices. They tend to dominate the national meetings where policy guidelines for the denominations and their lobbies are set. Moreover, they are often the targets of mobilization efforts by the Washington offices (Adams 1970; Hertzke 1988; Olson 2002; Reichley 1985) . Congregation members have much lower levels of knowledge than clergy about the lobbies (or even which denomination their church belongs to; Kellstedt and Green 1993) and participate in denominational decision-making roles far less frequently than clergy. As such, clergy are among the most important constituents of the lobbying offices. It is through clergy that the offices can cultivate grassroots support for their efforts (Olson 2002 ).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this article we are concerned with four plausible theoretical explanations of clergy's levels of support for their denominations' official national lobbying efforts. Surely ministers' own ideological orientations affect support, particularly in light of the fact that mainline Protestant Washington offices pursue identifiably liberal agendas. So too their attitudes about how fully their denominations should be involved in public political witness should affect their support for the offices. Ministers' personal levels of political engagement should also play a role in shaping their attitudes toward denominational lobbying, with those who are least politically engaged being least supportive of the offices. Finally, we explore the lingering ramifications of the internal dispute over full communion for clergy support of the Washington offices.
Political Orientations
It is only natural for citizens to feel kinship with political organizations perceived to advocate causes they support. People are drawn to organizations that they think approach politics from their own ideological vantage point. And "citizens ... are remarkably accurate in estimating the issue positions of strategic groups in politics.... Citizens can draw an impressively accurate map ... of who wants what politically, of who takes the same side, and who lines up on the opposing side of key issues" (Brady and Sniderman 1995: 93) . Social elites should be even better than the average citizen at determining who stands where politically, as elites usually possess more political resources and information than ordinary citizens (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus we hypothesize that clergy whose own political orientations are most consistent with the agendas pursued by their denominational Washington offices will be most supportive of them.
Specifically, the more liberal the minister's own politics, the more he or she should be expected to support the work of the Washington office. Mainline Protestant Washington offices are known for their political liberalism. Since the 1950s, the offices have pursued a peace-and-justice agenda by advocating for human rights at home and abroad, working to preserve the environment, questioning the United States' use of military force, and above all else demanding that the government assist the disadvantaged. In fact, certain mainline Protestant Washington offices have faced serious challenges from critics within their own denominations who think their agendas are too liberal. Controversy has swirled around the Presbyterian Washington Office; a conservative publication, The Presbyterian Layman, accused the office of pandering to liberals (Adams 1999; Marcum 2000) . The United Methodist Church's Washington office (which it calls the General Board of Church and Society) has also attracted its share of recent controversy ("Talk of Schism" 1998). Not surprisingly, we expect those clergy who are most likely to appreciate the social justice witness that the offices provide in Washington to support it most enthusiastically.
Social Theology
Clergy's evaluations of the Washington offices should also be rooted in their own normative theological understandings of the extent to which church and society should interact. James Guth and colleagues (1997) explain that clergy differ dramatically in their social theologies, or their perceptions of whether the church should be active in this world by tackling societal problems wherever possible or focus instead on changing the world by transforming individuals' spiritual lives one at a time. Consequently, clergy's attitudes toward their denominational Washington offices should be influenced by their views on whether churches in general should be involved in public political witness.
Most mainline Protestant clergy do agree that their denomination should be active in public affairs, but there is substantial disagreement over both means and ends ( 
Political Engagement
Like other citizens, some clergy are interested and engaged in political action and others eschew the political realm (Olson 2000) . Clergy who make time for political actionwhich is, of course, a secondary pursuit for them (Crawford 1995; Crawford and Olson 2001 )-do so because they feel a personal commitment to the need to "keep the Bible in one hand and the newspaper in the other" (as goes a familiar saying in mainline Protestant circles). Therefore, clergy who are accustomed to political action in their own day-to-day lives should not be likely to find similar action on the part of others unacceptable. As such, we expect that clergy who engage in politics themselves approve of the same at the denominational level.
Intra-Denominational Conflict
Like many Protestant denominations in recent decades, the ELCA and Episcopal Church have explored or finalized several formal agreements with other, like-minded denominations; indeed the ELCA itself is the product of a three-body merger in 1988. More important for our analysis, since the late 1960s the Episcopal Church and the ELCA's precursor denominations had engaged in discussions focusing on common theological beliefs and larger goals that might be accomplished through joint efforts while maintaining separate identities and governance structures. Ultimately the two denominations established a full communion arrangement in which they agreed to share clergy and mission resources. However, this decision did not come without substantial controversy and continuing internal fallout within both churches (Djupe and Gilbert 2003) .
Within the ELCA, the move to establish full communion with the Episcopal Church generated protests by a substantial minority of Lutherans beginning in the mid-1990s. This faction was narrowly able to prevent passage of the full communion proposal during the 1997 ELCA General Assembly; both denominations subsequently approved a revised agreement within three years' time, although even these revisions have not ended the controversy.' ELCA dissenters continue to resist implementation of the agreement through reduced financial contributions and calls for revisiting the issue of full communion, moves that signify strong discord within the ELCA and that may be a precursor to eventual schism (Djupe and Gilbert 2003) .
To understand the effects of full communion on clergy support for the Washington offices, we draw on Mancur Olson's (1965) argument that if organizations-especially professional associations created for purposes other than politics-satisfy the primary expectations of members (thereby sustaining an effectual selective benefit exchange), they build political capital that may later be expended on politics.
Denominations are akin to professional associations in that they are the primary mechanisms through which clergy secure employment. If satisfaction with the benefit exchange between the member and the organization creates support for the organization, Olson's theory implies that a reduction in benefits could weaken support (Brown 1989 ). In some ways, full communion strikes at the heart of the benefit exchange. Although full communion does not likely affect the ability of a minister to get a job, for some it may alter the terms of employment. This shift is particularly troublesome for those ELCA pastors, seminarians, and lay people who hold strong theological objections to Episcopal ordination beliefs and practices such as the historic episcopate (Djupe and Gilbert 2003) .
A substantial number of clergy we surveyed in both denominations expressed dissatisfaction with the direction full communion takes their denominations. Therefore, clergy who feel that their denomination is not meeting their expectations because of its pursuit of full communion should be expected to have weakened support for other activities the denomination undertakes, including lobbying.
CLERGY EVALUATIONS OF DENOMINATIONAL LOBBYING
To investigate clergy support for denominational involvement in national politics, we analyze ELCA and Episcopal clergy's responses to two key questions: whether their denomination's Washington lobbying office is effective, and whether lobbying is a legitimate activity for their denomination. Table I provides marginal percentages for, and shows the interrelationship between, these two variables. A modest majority (56 percent) of sample clergy agree that their denomination should lobby government, while 27 percent disagree and one in six are neutral or not sure. Table 1 also reports the marginal percentages for the job evaluations clergy gave their Washington offices. As shown in the "marginal percentage" column, 32 percent rated their denomination's Washington office job performance as "good" or "excellent," 36 percent rated it "fair" or "poor," and 32 percent did not offer an opinion. Clearly these two variables are related. Clergy evaluation of the offices improves as basic agreement with their purpose grows (the two measures are correlated at r=-0.372, p=0.000). There does appear to be a cap on granting positive job evaluations, however. Whereas clergy are more likely to rate the office's job performance as "excellent" if they agree strongly that the denomination should be involved in lobbying, there are far more clergy who rate the office's work as "poor" when they strongly disagree with denominational lobbying on general principle. That is, few clergy are willing or able to say that their denomination's Washington office is doing an excellent job despite modest support for the idea of lobbying.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF SUPPORT FOR THE WASHINGTON OFFICES
We now turn to investigate our four core hypotheses with multivariate regression models explaining the two Table 1 
Support for Denominational Lobbying
The first column of Table 2 presents the OLS regression estimates of agreement with the statement, "The (ELCA/Episcopal Church) should lobby government." The Lobby Government model demonstrates that political and theological orientations are both closely related to clergy approval of lobbying. This pattern is not surprising given the explicitly political mission of the Washington offices. Conservatives and Republicans are more likely to disagree that the denomination should lobby since it would be unlikely to represent their political views.
Two social theology variables achieve significance and are strong indicators of approval of denominational lobbying (as indicated by the standardized coefficient, beta). Clergy who agree that their denomination should be more involved with "social and political issues" approve more of lobbying. Agreeing that religious groups need to cooperate politically even if they disagree theologically-an ecumenical viewpoint-also increases approval of denominational lobbying. While this statement is not about lobbying per se, agreement does signal a pragmatic stance that solving social problems is more important than maintaining theological distinctiveness. An ecumenical orientation suggests a lack of trepidation about the coalition-building activity that all lobbies must pursue in order to thrive (Hula 1999) . Agreeing that the church should work to transform the social order, however, has no bearing on evaluations of whether the denomination should lobby. The Lobby Government model also shows that clergy who are politically engaged approve more of denominational lobbying. As is the case for clergy studied elsewhere ( Variables tapping sentiments about intra-denominational conflict are also significant predictors of lobbying approval, as Olson's byproduct theory suggests. Clergy opposed to the ELCA-Episcopal full communion agreement are less supportive of denominational lobbying. As noted previously, internal debates over full communion have led to significant dissension within the ELCA, where clergy are less supportive of full communion than Episcopal clergy (in the ELCA, 58 percent approve; in the Episcopal Church, 65 percent approve). This effect suggests that dissent over intra-denominational issues can poison the well and negatively affect other denominational activities. In this instance, even though the full communion issue has no specific connection to lobbying on national political issues, it seems to be an indicator of general dissatisfaction with the denomination that bleeds over into disapproval of the Washington lobbies. The effect is not determinative, of course, as the beta value confirms. The Lobby Government model further demonstrates that Episcopal clergy are less likely than ELCA clergy to approve of their denomination lobbying government. This is due in large part to less knowledge on the part of Episcopal clergy about what the Episcopal OGR does, fueled by the OGR's own lack of farming the grassroots (for discussion of this general notion, see Cigler 1991; Jordan and Maloney 1998; Milbrath 1959; Rothenberg 1992). The LOGA, by contrast, has state-level offices in roughly half of the fifty states that support additional networking with clergy. Finding supportive clergy and maintaining a relationship with them at the state level evidently leads to greater denomination-wide support for the work of the Washington office. However, the denominational difference also signals differing levels of intra-denominational political disagreement-we find greater diversity in the Episcopal Church in terms of clergy's political ideology, partisanship, and religious conservatism.5
Overall, the Lobby Government model in Table 2 indicates that clergy who approve of their denomination's lobbying efforts are more likely to be ecumenical, politically engaged, liberal, Democratic, Lutheran, and non-southern, whereas those who disapprove are more often religious particularists, politically quiescent, conservative, Republican, Episcopalian, southern, and opposed to full communion. The question of whether religious lobbies are legitimate therefore cuts along some of the most contentious lines in American religion. Although the most potent explanations concern the role of church in society and the liberal politics advocated (or assumed to be advanced) by the Washington offices, the principle of denominational lobbying is not immune to clergy's opinions of the direction of the denomination more generally.
Washington Office Job Evaluations
The factors affecting the job performance evaluations clergy give their denomination's Washington offices appear in the second column of Table 2 The Table 2 Olson's byproduct theory of lobbying also lends theoretical insight into how ELCA and Episcopal clergy evaluate the work of their denominational Washington offices. From this perspective, the denomination is seen as akin to a professional association that provides considerable selective benefits to the clergy who join. As Allen Hertzke notes, "Churches, after all, are not primarily political institutions, and members do not join for such representation" (1988: 206). Therefore, clergy will evaluate the activities of the denomination with selective benefits in mind, especially concerning the specific performance of their jobs.
The Washington offices of mainline Protestant denominations are and will likely remain in an uncomfortable position. Evidence here suggests that they could build stronger, more active grassroots support for their activities among resourceful clergy, yet doing so could weaken their denominational position through membership raveling (Johnson 1996) or by bringing attention to the possibilities of resource reallocation and increased oversight and scrutiny of their affairs (Lowry 1994 3We mailed surveys to 3,000 clergy in each denomination and contacted non-respondents once, two months after the initial mailing; the sample was drawn randomly from the ELCA and Episcopal Church annuals. The overall response rate was 47 percent for ELCA pastors and just under one-third for Episcopal priests and deacons. Respondents to the second mailing were not significantly different from first wave respondents on measures of interest.
4The second attempt at reaching full communion, "Called to Common Mission," passed in both denominations in 1999 (ELCA) and 2000 (Episcopal Church). 5For each of the three measures, the standard deviation for Episcopal clergy is a tenth to three-tenths higher than for ELCA clergy. 6This quotation from a Lutheran minister in rural New England is from an anonymous telephone interview conducted by Laura Olson on January 19, 2000.
